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The Arbitration of Employment
Disputes in the Securities Industry:
A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008
The arbitration of employ-ment disputes has been thesubject of intense interest in
recent years. On the one hand, pro-
ponents of the process maintain that
arbitration provides a faster and
cheaper means of resolving employ-
ment disputes than litigation. On the
other hand, despite numerous sup-
portive decisions on arbitration by
the U.S. Supreme Court,1 opponents
argue that arbitration is not an ade-
quate substitute for a judicial forum
because it does not provide a level
playing field. They maintain that
employers experienced in arbitration
enjoy an advantage in arbitration over
inexperienced employees (the so-
called “repeat player effect”).2 They
also express concerns that mandatory
arbitration “undermines the develop-
ment of public law for civil rights and
consumer rights, because there is no
meaningful judicial review of arbitra-
tors’ decisions.” They contend that
voluntary arbitration is more advanta-
geous to employees. In addition, they
say that employees have a better
chance of winning in post-dispute
voluntary arbitration than they do
under mandatory arbitration, and that
“arbitrators enjoy near complete free-
dom to ignore the law and even their
own rules because they know that
their rulings will not be seriously
examined by a court applying current
law.”3
Several of these criticisms of man-
datory and consumer arbitration are
stated in the findings section of a bill
that Congress is currently consider-
ing, called the Arbitration Fairness
Act (AFA).4 This bill would amend
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
ban the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employ-
ment, consumer, franchise, and civil
rights disputes.5
However, the issues raised by the
AFA “findings” have yet to be fully
examined using systematic, compre-
hensive empirical data. Only within
the last decade or so have researchers
begun to do serious statistical analyses
of critical issues in arbitration. In the
August-October 2009 issue of this
journal, our Cornell colleague,
Alexander Colvin, explained that the
research gap is due in part to “the
dearth of publicly available data on
which to conduct empirical research
that would help evaluate the argu-
ments of both sides of the employ-
ment arbitration debate.”6 He noted
that what little research exists “is
based on data made available to indi-
vidual researchers by arbitration ser-
vice providers,” such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) and
the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), which adminis-
ters employment and consumer arbi-
tration for the securities industry.
After reviewing some of the principal
empirical studies of employment arbi-
tration and discussing his own re-
search, Colvin ultimately concluded
that the picture is still not complete.
“[W]e are still trying to answer basic
questions about the general charac-
teristics of [the employment arbitra-
tion] dispute resolution system,” he
wrote.7
This article reports on the results
of our recent study of 3,200 arbitra-
tion awards issued in employment
cases administered under the auspices
of FINRA, its predecessor the
National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE).8 It responds
to Colvin’s call for more empirical
research while providing some data
on the debate over the fairness of
mandatory employment arbitration
agreements in the securities industry.
After disclosing the limitations of
our study and presenting our findings
with regard to the FINRA cases, we
consider how these findings bear on
the debate about mandatory arbitra-
tion, specifically whether or not our
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findings show a repeat player
effect in the FINRA employment
cases, or show that employees
fared better under FINRA’s vol-
untary arbitration than under
mandatory arbitration, or that
FINRA employment arbitration
does not protect employee civil rights.
Importance of Securities Cases
Although an analysis of the securities cus-
tomer-broker cases would clearly be valuable
(since there are so many more of them9), our pro-
fessional interest in employment
relations led us to focus only on
the employment awards. In any
event, it is clear that the securities
industry is an important focus for
the study of consumer and em-
ployment arbitration because our
contemporary arbitration system
can, in large part, be traced to
practices that had their origins in
that industry. Several of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s most important
decisions regarding arbitration
originated in the securities in-
dutry. For example, Shearson/
American Express v. McMahon,10
held that an investor who signed a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement
with a brokerage firm could be
compelled to arbitrate claims aris-
ing under the Securities and
Exchange Act. In Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc.,11 the Court overturned
Wilco v. Swan,12 which held that
claims arising under the Securities
Act could not be compelled to
arbitration by means of a contract.
Most critically for employment relations, the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp.,13 held that a bro-
ker-employee who had signed a registration form
(Form U4) with the SEC requiring the use of
arbitration to resolve statutory claims had waived
his right to take an age discrimination claim to
the federal courts. The Gilmer case is widely
credited with ushering in the widespread use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
employment relations.14
Overview of FINRA’s Arbitration Program
The securities employment arbitration pro-
gram began in 1986. Between 1986 and 2008,
about 3,200 employment awards were issued.
The NASD was the principal administrator but
the NYSE also administered cases. This changed
in 2007, when FINRA was established. FINRA
assumed the NASD’s enforcement and regulato-
ry functions and the NYSE and NASD dispute
resolution programs were consolidated under
FINRA’s authority.15
According to the FINRA Web site, FINRA is
“the largest independent regulator for all securi-
ties firms doing business in the
United States,” overseeing nearly
4,768 brokerage firms and 634,000
registered securities representa-
tives. FINRA also administers “the
largest dispute resolution forum
for investors in registered firms.”16
It also administers the employ-
ment arbitration program for the
securities industry under the Code
of Arbitration Procedure for In-
dustry Disputes (Industry Code).
Rule 13200 of the Industry Code
requires a dispute to be arbitrated
if it arises out of the business
activities of a “member” or an
“associated person” and is be-
tween or among members, associ-
ated persons, or members and
associated persons. Members are
brokers and dealers and associated
persons are people associated with
them (i.e., employees). The em-
ployees in FINRA employment
cases are brokers registered with
the SEC and authorized to recom-
mend and execute buy-sell orders,
known as registered representa-
tives. (These cases make up about 23% of all
FINRA filings.17) It is estimated that about one-
third of the employees in the securities industry
are registered representatives.18 We use the term
“employee” in this article to refer only to regis-
tered representatives.
Limitations of the FINRA Experience
We must acknowledge some limitations in our
analysis of the FINRA employment cases.
Although it is one of the largest mandatory arbi-
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tration programs in the country, it probably con-
stitutes a relatively small proportion of the total
number of employment claims that are arbitrated
under mandatory arbitration procedures.19 Also,
not all the cases were arbitrated under mandatory
procedures. The reason is that while the securi-
ties industry used mandatory arbitration to
resolve all employment claims from 1986-1999,
in 1999 the SEC approved the industry’s request
to make arbitration of employment discrimina-
tion claims voluntary under Rule 13201 of the
Code of Arbitration Procedure.20 That rule
became effective Jan. 1, 2000. However, other
types of employment claims remain subject to
mandatory arbitration under Rule 13200.
Simultaneously with the change to voluntary
arbitration of employment discrimination claims
in 2000, the SEC also approved other changes to
the rules governing discrimination claims. After
1999, arbitrators hearing discrimination claims
had to have a law degree, membership in a bar
association, substantial familiarity with the law,
10 or more years of experience in law practice,
law teaching, or government enforcement of
equal employment opportunities statutes, or
experience as a judge, arbitrator or mediator, or
in-house counsel with such matters. In addition,
the chair of a panel or a single arbitrator in a dis-
crimination case may not have represented pri-
marily the views of employers or of employees
within the previous five years.21
Some Findings of Our Study
Our study examined four variables: the types
of claims involved in FINRA awards, the average
size of the awards, the amounts awarded and the
time it took to render the awards. Each will be
examined in turn.
Types of Claims. Figure 1 shows the types of
claims made by employees. Out of 3,200 FINRA
cases analyzed:
• in 28%, employees claimed the employer
denied them compensation allegedly owed;
• in 27.4%, employees claimed the employer
had defamed them in some fashion (e.g., by
alleging they had “churned” a customer’s
account);
• in 13.5%, employees claimed they were
wrongfully terminated; and
• in 8.4%, employees claimed their employer
breached the contract.
Cases involving a claim of statutory discrimi-
nation constituted 17.1% of the total.
In every case, the employee (and counsel) pre-
sented the arbitrator with a monetary figure rep-
resenting the damages associated with the claim.
This figure usually included the claimant’s
demand for back pay and often included a claim
for punitive damages. In each case, the employer
denied that the employee’s claims had merit (and
sometimes filed counterclaims). The employer’s
position in each case was that the arbitrator
should not award the employee any money at all.
The Size of the Monetary Awards. In 61% of the
cases, the arbitrator found sufficient merit in the
employee’s claim to award the employee an
amount of money greater than zero. The total
sum awarded to employees over the life of the
program exceeds $467 million.
The average (or mean) award across all cases is
about $146,000 [$467 million divided by 3,200].
However, the average award is elevated because
of a handful of very large awards. The 10 largest
awards, for example, accounted for 22% (over
$101 million) of the total, and the 20 largest cases
accounted for nearly 30% (about $138 million).
The single largest award was $27.6 million (of
which $25 million was for punitive damages) in a
case called Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed.22 One
commentator called this a landmark case, saying
it “will go down in Wall Street history as the
longest arbitration and the largest punitive dam-
age award ever given to a financial advisor.”23
From filing through arbitration to appeals and
settlement, Sawtelle took 12 years. In 2001, a
three-person arbitration panel found that
Waddell had “orchestrated a campaign of decep-
tion” against Sawtelle and implied to clients that
he had mishandled their accounts, was untrust-
worthy, had left the business, and was even “in
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some way involved with the embezzling of client
funds.”
In addition to the $25 million in punitive dam-
ages, the panel awarded Sawtelle $1.8 million in
compensatory damages (plus compound post-
judgment interest), and $747,000 in attorney
fees. The panel also ordered that the defamatory
information Waddell and Reed had placed in
Sawtelle’s SEC file be expunged.
Waddell sought to vacate the award, but the
New York trial court modified the award only
slightly. On further appeal, the New York Ap-
pellate Division vacated the punitive damages
award and “remanded to the
original panel of arbitrators for
reconsideration of the issue of
punitive damages.”24 On re-
mand, the same arbitrators
again held the respondents
liable for $25 million in punitive
damages. Once again the Ap-
pellate Division vacated the
punitive damages award and
remanded the matter back to
arbitration.25 Sawtelle appealed
the Appellate Division’s deci-
sion to the New York Court of
Appeals, New York’s highest
court, but the court declined to
take the case. To avoid further
litigation, the parties negotiated
a settlement that resulted in
Sawtelle receiving about $10
million.26
The Sawtelle case is clearly
the exception to the norm in
FINRA employment arbitra-
tion. In fact, the median amount claimed in these
cases was $375,000, while the median amount
awarded was only $1,000—a mere quarter of a
percent of the amount claimed.
Economists analogize outcomes of the type we
found here to a sports tournament: for example,
in a tennis or a golf tournament, a small number
of entrants are top prize winners and therefore
receive very large purses, but the vast majority of
entrants in the tournament receive very little or
nothing.27
A tournament has a distribution of outcomes
that statisticians would term “skewed.” “In a
skewed distribution the mean (or simple average)
of the distribution is either higher or lower than
the median (which is the value of the observation
exactly at the mid-point of the distribution; i.e.,
50% of the observations in the distribution are
higher than the median and 50% are lower).
Only in a normal distribution (which has the
familiar bell-shaped curve) are the mean and
median values of the distribution equal.
It is not unusual to find skewed distributions in
other areas of life. Economists have noted that
many labor markets seem to resemble tourna-
ments; for example, in the performing arts, a rel-
atively small number of actors receive extremely
high levels of compensation (some actors receive
$20 million or more to appear in a single motion
picture), whereas the vast majority of actors earn
very little.28 There are two fundamental ap-
proaches to judging whether a market, an organi-
zation, or a dispute resolution process is fair and
equitable: “Distributive justice”
calls for a judgment about
whether the outcomes are just
or fair; “procedural justice” calls
for a judgment about whether
the procedures followed during
the process are just or fair.29
Some people judge fairness on
the basis of outcomes. They
believe that any process that
produces extremely high salary
for actors and baseball players,
and very large bonuses for Wall
Street bankers, must be inher-
ently unfair.
We are reluctant to make
such judgments based only on
the size and distribution of
FINRA awards. In our view,
standards of procedural justice
should be used to evaluate the
fairness of an arbitration pro-
gram: Thus, the rules and pro-
cedures that govern in these
cases—the inputs, rather than the outputs—must
be examined.
Employee Win Rates. Researchers frequently use
“win rates” to evaluate arbitration outcomes, but
the term “win” is obviously sensitive to precisely
how it is defined. For instance, a “win” might be
defined to mean that the arbitrator awarded some
amount of money to the claimant, regardless of
how little the award or the relationship of the
award to the amount claimed. (For example, a
$1,000 award to an employee who claimed $10
million in damages.) Even though the employee
receiving this amount probably would not think of
this as a win, most empirical researchers would,
since they consider any award of money to an
employee to be a victory for the employee because
the arbitrator found liability on the part of the
employer.30 If we use this definition, then the
employee win rate in the FINRA cases we studied
is 61%, while the employer win rate is 39%.
Our study 
examined four
variables in the
FINRA awards:
the types of
claims involved,
the average size
of the awards, the
amounts awarded
and the time it
took to render 
the awards. 
Suppose we redefine a win to mean any case in
which the award is greater than 50% of the
amount claimed. Using this definition of a win,
the employee win rate drops to about 20% and
the employer win rate jumps to 80%.
There is wide variation in the findings of pre-
vious research on win rates in employment arbi-
tration cases.31 In the majority of these studies, a
win is defined as any award in which the employ-
ee receives any amount of money.32 The win
rates in these studies range from a low of 20% to
a high of 74%.33 The employee win rate in our
study of the FINRA cases sits firmly within the
range of employee win rates found by other
researchers.
Swiftness of the Proceedings. To gauge the swift-
ness of the proceedings in FINRA cases, we
examined three different time-related variables:
(1) the time between the filing of the demand and
the issuance of the award; (2) the time between
the final hearing session and the issuance of the
award; and (3) the number of hearing sessions in
each case. (FINRA defines a hearing session as
half a day.)
The mean elapsed time between filing of a
complaint and issuance of an award was 513 days,
or about 17 months. The mean elapsed time
between the final hearing session and the
issuance of an award was 110 days, or a little less
than four months. The mean number of hearing
sessions was 7.4 (i.e., 3.7 days).
Once again the distribution of hearing sessions
across all cases was highly skewed. The median
number of hearing sessions was 4.0 (i.e., 2 days).
The three longest cases had 201, 145, and 108
sessions, but excluding those cases from the cal-
culation of the mean had almost no effect: it
reduced that statistic from 7.4 to 7.23 sessions.
Our findings regarding the speed of FINRA
employment arbitration compares favorably with
employment arbitration in other fora. For exam-
ple, Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill
reported that the mean time between filing to
disposition of an employment discrimination
claim in federal court was 709 days, or nearly 2
years.34
Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner examined
over 3,000 employment discrimination cases filed
in federal court in New York during the period
1997-2001; they found only 125 cases (3.8%)
resulted in a trial to conclusion and a median
time from filing to verdict of 25 months. They
also examined 186 NASD cases conducted during
the same period; they found a median time of 16
months from filing to the issuance of the award.35
This was 33% sooner than in the federal court
cases.
More recently Colvin examined 849 AAA
employment arbitration cases, finding a mean
time from filing to decision of 332 days—about
11 months.36
We tentatively conclude that 17 months be-
tween filing a FINRA case and issuance of the
award compares favorably to the 25-month peri-
od for litigating discrimination cases in federal
court , but not as favorably to AAA employment
arbitration that did not involve employment dis-
crimination claims.
How Our Findings Relate to the Debate Over
Employment Arbitration
Our analysis of the FINRA awards casts light
on three major issues raised by critics of manda-
tory employment arbitration. First, do repeat
employers have an advantage over one-shot
employees? Second, is voluntary arbitration more
advantageous for employees than mandatory
arbitration? Third, does employment arbitration
provide adequate protection of employees’ civil
rights?
The Repeat Player Effect. Some scholars believe
that employers are repeat players in arbitration
and therefore have an advantage over employees
who are first-time players in employment arbitra-
tion. They contend that employers are likely to
have more arbitration experience and better rep-
resentation in arbitration than employees.37
Empirical researcher Lisa Bingham uncovered
the repeat player effect in several empirical stud-
ies of employment arbitration.38 For example, in
a study of 244 employment arbitration cases,
Bingham found an employee win rate of 29%
when the case involved a repeat employer and a
win rate of 62% when there was no repeat
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employer. Bingham replicated her results in fol-
low-up studies.39
In our examination of the possible existence of
a repeat player effect in FINRA employment
arbitrations, we came to realize that the concept
is not as clear as one might think. Previous
researchers would have counted an employer as a
repeat player in employment arbitration if they
found the employer’s name repeated in additional
cases. But there are factors that weigh against this
method of counting repeat players. Should a firm
that has been involved in a merger, acquisition,
or restructuring be considered the same firm?
Suppose there are long gaps between a firm’s
involvement in one FINRA arbitration case and
its involvement in another (for example, one in
1998 and another 10 years later). Suppose a firm
has been involved in several FINRA cases, but
the cases have been conducted at different loca-
tions. What if the attorney representing the firm
is different in each case? Previous researchers
have not made these distinctions.
An examination of the FINRA employment
cases reveals that the attorneys representing a
single securities firm changed from case to case.
Should the firm be considered a repeat player
only if it is represented by the same attorney? If
the attorneys change from one arbitration case to
another, then perhaps the firm should be consid-
ered a repeat player only if it has an “institutional
memory.” By this we mean that a firm passes on
its experience in previous employment arbitra-
tion cases to the new attorneys.
It also should not be assumed that only firms
are repeat players. Even if an employee has never
previously been involved in an employment arbi-
tration, the employee’s attorney may have repre-
sented multiple employees in the past. In the
FINRA cases, we found some law firms that had
repeatedly represented different employees.40 If
the employee is represented by a highly experi-
enced, successful attorney, then the disadvantage
the employee is alleged to have by virtue of being
a one-shot player is certainly diminished, if not
eliminated.
We also need to consider whether the experi-
ence of the parties and their attorneys in other
fora (such as in employment cases administered
by the AAA) could make all of them repeat play-
ers. This experience is undoubtedly relevant to
the skills the attorneys are able to exercise in
FINRA cases.
We have not yet explored all the possible
dimensions of the repeat player phenomenon in
the FINRA cases. However, using the conven-
tional definition of a repeat player, we have ana-
lyzed who the repeat players are in the FINRA
employment arbitration cases. Table 1 shows that
some major securities firms had scores of arbitra-
tion cases during the existence of the FINRA
arbitration program. Over 19% of all FINRA
awards involved the same five firms, about 30%
involved the same 10 firms. On average, one of
these firms was the respondent in 88 cases.
The average number of cases in which the
other firms were involved was 2.6. We performed
various statistical tests to determine whether the
win rates of the firms that were major users of the
FINRA arbitration program were higher than the
win rates of firms that had been involved in only
one or two cases. For example, we compared the
win rate of the top five firms with the win rate of
all other firms; we also compared the win rate of
the top ten firms with the win rate of all other
firms.
Table 1: Number of Awards in Cases Involving the 
Top Five Users of the FINRA Employment 
Arbitration Program
Company Name Number of Awards Percent of Total Awards
Prudential 213 6.7
Merrill Lynch 168 5.3
Citigroup 80 2.5
A.G. Edwards 74 2.3
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 73 2.3
Total 608 19.1
For these tests we considered an employer win
to be any case in which the arbitrator awarded
nothing to the employee. Under this definition
the firms as a group won about 39% of the cases.
The top ten firms had a win rate of 46.7%, while
the top five had a win rate of 50.2%. The win
rate for all other firms was 35.%.
These differences are statistically signifi-
cant.41 However, when we conducted a multivari-
ate regression analysis, using the size of the
award (corrected for inflation) as the dependent
variable and a repeat player variable as one of
several explanatory variables, we found that the
repeat player variable had no significant effect on
the size of the award. This finding suggests that
other factors (such as the size of the claim, the
nature of the charge, etc.) may have more influ-
ence than their experience in arbitration on the
size of the awards of the top five or ten firms. Put
another way, despite the higher win rates of the
repeat players with the most experience in
FINRA arbitration, there may not be a causal
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relationship between that experience and the size
of the firms’ awards.42
Mandatory versus Voluntary Arbitration. Critics
of mandatory arbitration maintain that the distinc-
tion between mandatory and voluntary arbitration
has a significant effect on arbitration outcomes:
employees, they argue, are at a disadvantage under
mandatory arrangements and are likely to receive
lower awards than they would if they had the
option of voluntarily using arbitration after a dis-
pute arises. FINRA’s changes in the handling of
arbitration of employment discrimination cases
after 1999 has provided an opportunity to com-
pare two distinct arbitration regimes: a mandatory
regime with somewhat looser pro-
cedures and a voluntary regime
with more stringent procedures.
One effect we found was a dra-
matic decline in the number of
discrimination awards after 1999.
From 1986 through 1999, there
were 288, an average of 22 a year.
From 2000 through 2008, there
were only 50 discrimination awards,
an average of six awards a year.
Because we only studied FINRA
employment cases that went to 
an award, we cannot determine
whether there was a drop in dis-
crimination case filings. Never-
theless, we think it reasonable to
postulate that after 1999, when
employees in the securities indus-
try were no longer compelled to
arbitrate discrimination claims,
most chose litigation.
We also found that after 1999 the mean and
median awards in discrimination cases signifi-
cantly increased. From the inception of the
employment program through 1999, the mean
was $66,405 and the median was $225. After
1999, the mean award was $183,728 and the
median was $578.
These differences are statistically significant.
Once again we used multiple regression analysis
to control for other factors that might influence
the size of the awards in discrimination cases. We
found that, when other factors influencing
awards were controlled, the awards in discrimina-
tion cases were about $11,500 higher after 1999
than they had been before 1999, representing
about an 8% increase in the size of discrimina-
tion awards.43
Our analysis of the FINRA data strongly sug-
gests that there is no other factor that can explain
the drop in the number of discrimination awards
and the increase in the size of awards in those
cases after 1999, other than the change from
mandatory to stricter voluntary procedures. This
provides some support to the critics of mandatory
arbitration, although additional evidence is
required before firm conclusions can be drawn.
The Protection of Civil Rights
Regarding the protection of civil rights, we
have not uncovered any evidence that mandatory
arbitration in the securities industry undermined
civil rights because of a lack of “meaningful judi-
cial review” of arbitration awards. Readers of the
Dispute Resolution Journal understand that courts
give great deference to arbitral decisions and in
general are reluctant to vacate
them.44 However, they have
shown greater willingness to scru-
tinize awards when consumers and
employees with statutory claims
challenge the arbitration process
on the ground of unconscionabili-
ty.45 These decisions have provid-
ed important guidance to arbitra-
tion providers and arbitrators as
to what constitutes a fair arbitra-
tion procedure.
We have not found any court
decisions dealing with uncon-
scionability that arise out of a
FINRA or NASD employment
arbitration case. FINRA and
NASD rules were designed to be
fair and avoid the taint of uncon-
scionability. Whenever critics
have pointed to weaknesses in the
rules (as in the case of discrimination claims),
FINRA has generally tried to correct those weak-
nesses.
With the help of several graduate students, we
read a large sample of the employment arbitra-
tion awards, searching for cases in which the
arbitrator or panel failed to give due regard to
claims of employment discrimination. Our exam-
ination did not reveal any FINRA cases in which
the arbitrators, in our judgment, failed to ade-
quately weigh employee claims of discrimination.
We found this to be true under both mandatory
and voluntary arbitration regimes.
Critics of mandatory arbitration might argue
that our examination was insufficient, but we
believe it is a first step in making a judgment on
this important question, if only in the context of
a single industry.
A related question we considered is whether
arbitrators who decide workplace disputes have
the skills, experience, and qualifications to decide
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statutory employment discrimination claims. The
NASD and its successor FINRA have both
shown great concern about the qualifications of
arbitrators to hear statutory complaints. This was
a major reason why the NASD introduced
stricter qualification requirements for arbitrators
hearing discrimination cases in 1999. Today,
FINRA requires all arbitrators newly admitted to
its roster to undergo training and standardized
testing.46 It also requires all arbitrators on its ros-
ter to be trained in new and revised rules of pro-
cedure, as well as in special topics, such as
motions to dismiss and expungement.
In sum we have not uncovered any evidence
that the FINRA arbitration program has failed to
protect the civil rights of claimants.
Conclusions
Our study of FINRA’s employment arbitration
program had the purpose of providing an
overview of the FINRA experience and deter-
mining whether that experience exhibited defi-
ciencies of the type described by critics of
mandatory employment arbitration. Although
our analysis is admittedly limited, it does allow us
to draw two tentative conclusions. First, employ-
ment arbitration under FINRA does not appear
to be substantially different from employment
arbitration administered by other providers.
Second, the switch from mandatory to volun-
tary procedures produced mixed results: it
reduced the number of discrimination awards
(and possibly the number of discrimination
claims moving to arbitration), but it increased the
size of the awards in such cases. 
We also found evidence of a correlation be-
tween the win rate and the experience of the bro-
kerage firms that most often use FINRA arbitra-
tion cases. Although this suggests a repeat player
effect, more sophisticated analysis suggests that
other factors are more important in predicting
the size of the awards than previous experience in
FINRA arbitration.
Our analysis does not deal with other criti-
cisms of mandatory arbitration. We believe that
research still needs to be undertaken into many
aspects of employment arbitration, including, for
example, access to the arbitration process, the
criteria used to decide arbitral issues, the rela-
tionship between the type of claim and the out-
come, and the nature of non-monetary claims,
counterclaims and awards. 
In the meantime, we hope our study sheds
additional light on the FINRA employment arbi-
tration process and the validity of criticisms of
mandatory arbitration. We plan to continue to
analyze the FINRA cases and hope to have addi-
tional results to report in the future. n
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